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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of environmental justice, both as a form of practice and
of discourse, signals a basic shift in the way we conceive environmen-
tal law. Traditionally, environmental law has been viewed as excep-
tionally technical and scientific,' demanding from lawyers and
* Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School 1993-95; Co-Director, Alternatives for
Community and Environment, Inc. A.B. Brown University; M.A. (History), J.D. University
of Virginia; Ph.D. candidate (Jurisprudence and Social Policy), University of California at
Berkeley.
** Visiting Scholar, Boston College Law School 1993-95; Co-Director, Alternatives for
Community and Environment Inc. B.A. Yale University; J.D. University of Virginia.
1. A testament to the purported technical nature of environmental statutes is the opin-
ion issued by the Office of General Counsel soon after the United States Environmental
Protection Agency was established in 1970. The opinion held that, due to the scientific bent
of environmental law, civil rights laws and other policies addressing social and political
equality are inapplicable. Further, in testimony before the United States Commission on Civil
Rights in 1971, then EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus argued that the EPA's scientif-
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laypersons a modicum of familiarity with esoteric notions such as risk
analysis, point sources, best available technology, and the like. Envi-
ronmental law, we have been told, is the domain of the expert, the
scientist, the specialist. Indeed, the infamous array of acronyms, from
CERCLA and SIPs to NPDES and NAAQS, is a metaphor that under-
scores the opaque, if not incomprehensible, nature of environmental
laws and regulations.
As a result of this conception of environmental law, debate and
decisionmaking on environmental matters typically have been confined
to those who can claim some expertise in the field-attorneys, scien-
tists, engineers, and planners. Often underwriting this expertise, of
course, have been the businesses and industries with so much at stake
in the campaign to regulate environmental harms.2 Left out, however,
have been the people least able to obtain access to, let alone expertise
in, environmental policymaking: individuals from low-income commu-
nities and communities of color. At the same time, these communities
have had a substantial stake in the shape and content of environmental
policy because historically they have borne the brunt of environmental
harms?
ic role in setting environmental standards precluded the application of civil rights law to
environmental programs. See Recommendations to the Presidential Transition Team for the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on Environmental Justice Issues Submitted by the
Environmental Justice Transition Group, The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, The Environmental Justice Project (Dec. 21, 1992) (on file with authors).
From the start, then, environmental law has been seen as incompatible with social
and political concerns such as due process and equal protection. On one side stood science,
on the other, fairness and equality.
2. PACs and other lobbying groups representing industry and business typically wield
tremendous influence on legislators struggling to strike a balance between economic growth
and environmental protection. Of course, high-powered environmental groups, such as the
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Environmental Defense Fund, also do their part
to ensure that environmental concerns are taken seriously by legislators. None of these inter-
ests, however, has historically been responsive to the communities most often in need of
protection. See infra note 3.
3. See, e.g., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993); PAUL MOHAI & BUNYAN BRYANT, RACE AND THE INCI-
DENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS (1992); Richard Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental
Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787
(1993). It should also be noted that these communities have not been represented within the
mainstream environmental movement. As a result, policies and practices called for by tradi-
[Vol. 96:11171118
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 15
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss4/15
19941 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, JUSTICE, 'AND DEMOCRACY
This is not to say that citizens, especially those able to afford
legal representation, have been excluded entirely from participating in
matters affecting their health and environment. Citizen suits, for in-
stance, allow individuals and groups to bring legal actions against gov-
ernment or private actors after filing notice of intent to sue.' Such
suits have proved to be highly effective in engaging local citizens in
the process of environmental protection.5 Yet, citizen suits are essen-
tially ex post facto remedies. That is, they typically occur after some
environmental law or set of laws has already been broken and the
harm to the environment and the public health a fait accompli.' More-
over, these suits require that citizens be able to obtain substantial legal
assistance. The mere drafting of a two- or three-page notice letter, for
instance, often demands countless hours of difficult legal research.7
Consequently, communities that cannot afford even low-cost attorney
fees are without recourse to citizen suits.
tional environmental groups have not accounted for the needs of low-income communities
and communities of color. See Charles Jordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities,
and the Mainstream Environmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT: PERSPECTIVE FOR A NEW ERA (Donald Snow ed., 1991); ROBERT GOTTLIEB,
FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVE-
MENT (1993).
4. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619 (1988); Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604, 7607(f) (1988).
5. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Environmental Law as a Mirror of the Future: Tracing
the Consequences of a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms, 22 B.C. ENVT'L AFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1994).
6. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1990), for instance,
a citizen suit challenging an EPA remedial action decision cannot be brought until that ac-
tion has been "taken." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (1988). Some courts have defined "taken" to
mean completed, thus precluding pre-implementation judicial review. See Alabama v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 1989); Schalk v.
Thomas, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1655, 1657 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Frey v. Thomas, 28 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1660, 1662 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
Others have concluded that the plain language of the statute does not provide an
answer as to when review is available. See, e.g., Neighborhood Toxic Cleanup Emergency v.
Reilly, 716 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989) (language of Section 310 is not entirely clear about
what constitutes action taken). However, no court has in fact allowed a pre-implementation
challenge by citizens to a remedial action decision.
7. A notice letter drafted by the authors and another attorney on a Superfund case,
for example, required as much as thirty hours of research and writing, a sizable workload
by any account.
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Environmental justice is principally about opening up discussion
and the practice of environmental law and policy to traditionally
underrepresented communities. It is about ensuring that the same pro-
cesses that so seriously affect the health and welfare of these commu-
nities also include them in a meaningful, democratic way. In this essay,
we attempt to view the process-dimension of environmental justice
through a broad, cultural lens. That is, we seek to situate the turn
toward grassroots participation in environmental law within the larger
cultural matrix in which it occurs. To this end, we set forth below an
example of environmental justice in process: a New Bedford, Massa-
chusetts community's struggle to cleanup a polluted harbor while mak-
ing sure that the cure is not worse than the disease. Next, we suggest
that environmental justice fits well with a postmodernist/pragmatist
approach to social reform, discussing the tell-tale features of
postmodernism and pragmatism. We conclude by urging that the sys-
tem of environmental law heed the call of environmental justice activ-
ists and become, in essence, postmodemist/pragmatist.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND THE PRIMACY OF
PROCESS: HANDS ACROSS THE RIVER AND
THE NEW BEDFORD HARBOR HOT SPOT
In New Bedford, Massachusetts, the Acushnet River flows into the
Atlantic Ocean. Once a mighty seaport and center of the whaling in-
dustry in the early 1800s, New Bedford resembles most old New Eng-
land cities-vestiges of former prosperity in its vacant brick factories,
and its handsome, though diminished, dwellings. The New Bedford
Harbor, still home to one of the largest commercial fishing fleets in
the United States, sits in a strange silence. Beneath the uneasy surface,
some of the highest concentrations in the world of polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) and other heavy metals lurk in the sediment.8
As is often the case, past prosperity has its price, for the same
businesses that had brought jobs and wealth to New Bedford following
the decline of the whaling industry also transformed the Acushnet
8. Record of Decision Summary, New Bedford Harbor/Hot Spot Operable Unit, New
Bedford, MA, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region I, 2-4 (Apr. 1990).
1120 [Vol. 96:1117
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River from a dynamic ecosystem into a flowing sarcophagus. For in-
stance, adjacent to an electrical capacitor manufacturing facility located
along the western bank of the river estuary, sediment concentrations of
PCBs range from 4,000 parts per million (ppm) to over 200,000 ppm.9
The United States Food and Drug Administration has set a tolerance
limit of 5 ppm for PCBs in edible tissue.'"
In 1977, following an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
survey documenting PCB contamination in New England, the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Health issued a public warning against
consumption of shellfish or bottom fish from within the New Bedford
Harbor. In July 1982, the New Bedford Harbor was added to the EPA
Superfund National Priorities List. Over the course of the next two
years, a Remedial Action Master Plan and Feasibility Study were con-
ducted, pursuant to the process spelled out in the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). In
1989, an Engineering Feasibility Study, Pilot Dredging and Disposal
Study, and Hot Spot Feasibility Study were also conducted pursuant to
CERCLA."
The Hot Spot Area is located along the western bank of the
Acushnet River estuary next to the electrical capacitor manufacturing
facility formerly owned and operated by Aerovox, Inc. It is deemed a
Hot Spot because of the particularly high levels of PCBs detected in
the sediment; it poses a serious threat not only to human health but
also to the health of marine organisms.'2
On April 6, 1990, the Record of Decision (ROD), which presented
the selected remedial action for the Hot Spot Area, called the Hot Spot
Operable Unit, was signed by Julie Belaga, then Regional Administra-
tor.'3 The major components of the Operable Unit included dredging
9. Id. at 1-2. The two principal facilities responsible for the PCBs and other heavy
metals deposited in the river sediment were operated by Aerovox, Inc. and Cornell-Dubilier
Electronics, Inc., respectively. Each was a major user of PCBs from the time their opera-
tions commenced in the 1940s until 1978, when EPA banned the use of PCBs.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 3-4.
12. Id. at 7-8.
13. Id.
1121
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of the river sediment, transportation and dewatering of the sediment,
incineration of the sediment PCBs, and stabilization of the residual
ash. 4 The Operable Unit was to be placed on Sawyer Street, on a lot
abutting the shoreline some distance downstream from the Hot Spot
Area. The Sawyer Street site is located in a densely populated, ethni-
cally diverse neighborhood; many of the neighborhood residents are
unemployed, elderly, or very young. The site lies within seventy-five
yards of a playground.
In the ROD, the Regional Administrator declared that the chosen
remedial action
is protective of human health and the environment, complies with Federal
and State applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements directly asso-
ciated with this action, and is cost-effective. This action utilizes permanent
solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maximum extent
practicable, and this action satisfies the statutory preference for treatment
as a principal element of the remedy. 5
"Community relations" is a required component of the CERCLA
process and is the principal means by which the EPA keeps the local
community and other interested parties apprised of cleanup activities.
In the ROD for the New Bedford Hot Spot, the EPA claimed that it
met its statutory community relations obligations. The statute requires
that the EPA develop procedures to ensure notice to potentially affect-
ed persons and the public (including a brief analysis of the remedial
plan and alternatives that were considered) and provide a reasonable
opportunity to comment, a public meeting in the affected area, and a
response to "each of the significant comments, criticisms, and new data
submitted in written or oral presentations."' 6
During the course of the planning process, the EPA presented the
plans for and the results of various investigations and feasibility studies
at a series of public meetings. The EPA also awarded a Technical As-
sistance Grant to a Community Work Group. In June 1989, the EPA
made the Administrative Record available for public review in the
14. Id. at 26-28.
15. Id. at iii.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (1988).
[Vol. 96:11171122
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EPA's regional offices in Boston and at the New Bedford Public Li-
brary and published a notice and analysis of the Proposed Plan in two
local newspapers, including a Portuguese-language paper. On August 3,
1989, the EPA held an informational meeting. That meeting marked
the beginning of the public comment period. The EPA then held an
informal public meeting on August 16, 1989, extended the public com-
ment period to October 2, 1989, and held two more public meetings at
which the Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) outlined an alternative
cleanup plan. The Community Work Group and the general public
sought comments from the EPA and the PRPs about each alterna-
tive.' 7
Thus, the EPA apparently complied with its statutory duty of com-
munity relations, fulfilling and even exceeding the requirements for
public comment. In addition, the EPA complied with the requirement
that it address "significant criticisms." Thus, in outlining the communi-
ty relations program at the site, the ROD noted that "community con-
cern and involvement have been and continue to be high."' 8 Further,
the EPA noted that while the public's initial concerns "focused on
potential health impacts as a result of living near the Harbor or eating
fish caught in the Harbor, potential impacts on the local fishing indus-
try and potential limitations on waterfront development activities," the
community concerns had changed over time and "now also include the
environmental, economic and health impacts of remedial alternatives
evaluated for the Hot Spot."' 9
In discussing its choice of incineration over the other alternatives,
the EPA again noted the community's concerns over the health impacts
of the various remedial options. Specifically, the ROD indicated that
"[c]ommunity concerns over the selected remedy are focused on the
operation of the incinerator, the impacts of dredging, and storage of
the treated material."2 These concerns "are addressed," according to
the ROD, "by specifying compliance with the RCRA and TSCA in-
cinerator standards."2'
17. Record of Decision, supra note 8, at 6-7.
18. Id. at 6.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 32.
21. Id.
1123
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A closer look at the community relations plan indicates that nomi-
nal compliance with the statutory duty and a truly engaging process are
two different matters. The gap between compliance and "due process"
may explain the explosion of public concern over the health effects of
incineration that developed after the EPA signed the Record of Deci-
sion.
It should be noted that, according to the ROD, the EPA generally
considers "community acceptance" of a proposed alternative after it has
"received public comment on the RI/FS and the Proposed Plan."22 In
other words, the community's concerns are incorporated into the ROD
after the EPA has chosen an alternative. This process constitutes agen-
da-setting of the first order. The public comment is not addressed to
which alternative is "better," but rather must attack a remedy that has
already been chosen. Thus, the EPA does not incorporate the public's
input into the decisionmaking process itself. Furthermore, given the
timing of the public comment, the EPA does not have to choose an
alternative that addresses the community's concerns. Rather, the timing
encourages the EPA to treat the public's questions as issues to be dealt
with at some future date or to be explained away.
Further, as a substantive matter, the EPA's "response" did not
truly address the public's concerns. Though the EPA has suggested that
requiring compliance with RCRA and TSCA incinerator standards ad-
dresses the public's concerns, Hands Across the River (HAR) received
information from grassroots groups from around the country that indi-
cates that the citizens' concern with regard to incineration is not the
legal limits themselves, but whether incinerators actually meet those
standards. HAR's main argument'was that incinerators are dangerous
even if they meet legal limits in test bums, an argument that derived
from the information HAR learned from other organizations facing
similar remedial action decisions. For example, the January 1, 1993,
issue of "Hazardous Materials Intelligence Report" reported that
[h]azardous waste incinerators that meet the requirements under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) for burning the chemical
compounds that serve as dioxin "surrogates" in trial bums may have diffi-
culty in achieving high destruction removal efficiencies "on dioxin itself
due to the low levels at which the dioxin is normally present." 3
22. Id. at 30. RI/FS stands for the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study.
23. Hazardous Materials Intelligence Report, Jan. 1, 1993, at 1 (on file with the au-
1124 [Vol. 96:1117
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Similarly, grassroots organizations sent HAR internal EPA memos
indicating that incinerators around the country had failed to meet the
required levels for dioxin destruction.24
Compliance with the statutory requirements for public participation,
then, does not mean that the public has participated in the decision. In
the New Bedford case, because the public's comments -were "answered"
only late in the game, the EPA failed both as a procedural matter and
as a substantive matter to engage the "significant concerns" raised by
the citizens groups. The result was an uprising after the ROD was
signed.
HAR orchestrated a formidable campaign against the ROD. By the
fall of 1993, HAR had enlisted the New Bedford City Council in the
fight to stop the proposed incineration. The Council passed ordinances
that prohibited the transportation of incineration equipment through
New Bedford and prevented water hook up to the site. By its actions,
the Council risked $25,000 a day fines threatened by the EPA. Though
the city ultimately settled the dispute without incurring the fines, the
controversy brought national attention to New Bedford.Y In addition,
HAR orchestrated an effective publicity campaign using local cable
access and other sources to spread its message. Finally, HAR filed a
notice of intent to sue the EPA, alleging, among other claims, that the
incinerator would violate state environmental law that the EPA had
agreed to abide. 6
The EPA eventually consented to a mediation process. HAR, other
concerned citizens, the EPA, the Massachusetts Department of Environ-
mental Protection, members of the City Council, and other local politi-
cians formed a review board to consider alternative technologies.
Through this remarkable process, each side articulated its interests in
the dispute, put together a list of alternatives to incineration, and then
thors).
24. Interview with David Hammond, Hands Across the River (Dec. 22, 1992).
25. The EPA's dirty secret, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 1994, at 74; Natalie White, City,
EPA Strike Deal on PCB Site Planning, NEW BEDFORD STANDARD TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at
1.
26. HAR Notice of Intent to Sue the EPA (on file with the authors).
1125
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listened to presentations from vendors of various cleanup technologies.
Although HAR has the support of technical and legal advisors, the
group speaks for itself and is fully engaged in the highly technical pro-
cess.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND A BETTER DEMOCRACY:
FROM MODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM
The mediation process at New Bedford is a model of the
decisionmaking process envisioned by environmental justice advocates.
Citizens' interests are considered at the outset, and most importantly,
during the comparison of alternatives. Further, the process proves that
there is no decision or process "too technical" for concerned citizens.
In sum, citizens have a seat at the decisionmaking table. They are
involved face to face with the EPA, as equals, and thus are a part of
an ongoing dialogue, rather than an adjunct to the process.
The traditional model of environmental law discussed in the intro-
duction and the approach represented by the New Bedford case fit well
into a larger cultural framework. Looking at this framework helps to
explain the shift from science and technology to community participa-
tion represented by the New Bedford case. By situating the New Bed-
ford case in a larger cultural matrix, we can better understand the
rightness or propriety of the turn to community participation in the
light of the democratic values underlying not only our federal environ-
mental laws but all laws.
In its commitment to science, technology, and rational bureaucracy
as the essential tools of environmental protection, the traditional envi-
ronmental law model embodies a modernistic approach to social prob-
lems. Modernism privileges technology and rationality; it celebrates
bureaucratic power and the rational planning of ideal social orders
based on standardized knowledge and production.27
27. The characterizations of modernism and postmodernism which are presented in this
essay derive largely from our reading of DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY (1989). See infra note 29. For didactic purposes, his interpretations are
helpful because they are cogent and straightforward. As heuristic tools, however, they are
inadequate in that they not only present a problematically seamless picture of modernism
1126 [Vol. 96:1117
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Thus, for instance, Superfund is modernist because it conspicuous-
ly privileges science and technology-remedial investigations, feasibility
studies, technology assessments, and the like--over community partici-
pation as the approach to cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Invariably,
environmental laws privilege science and technology over community
involvement. Also, while science and technology are viewed as em-
bodying rationality, community participation is typically seen as repre-
senting emotionalism and alarmism. The two are thus taken to be op-
posites.
The modernist cast of Superfund is arguably a central part of its
shortcomings. There is a general consensus that Superfund's primary
flaw is the delay that occurs between the listing of a site on the Na-
tional Priorities List and its final clean up.28
and postmodemism but clearly serve his admittedly Marxist politics.
The definition of both modernism and postmodemism is highly contested. While
most scholars agree that both conditions are oppositional to, say, nineteenth century Victori-
anism (itself an ambiguous concept), there is no clear consensus on the conceptual make-up
of modernism and postmodemism. On modernism, see MODERNISM CULTURE IN AMERICA
(Daniel Singal ed., 1991) (the essays by Daniel Singal, Malcolm Bradbury, and David
Hollinger are particularly helpful in illuminating the epistemological problems associated with
modernism); CECELIA TICHI, SHIFTING GEARS: TECHNOLOGY, LITERATURE, CULTURE IN
MODERNIST AMERICA (1987); MODERNISM, 1890-1930 (M. Bradbury & J. McFarlane eds.,
1976); HUGH KENNER, A HOMEMADE WORLD: THE AMERICAN MODERNIST WRITERS (1975).
On postmodemism, see EDWARD SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSER-
TION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); ALLAN MEGILL, PROPHETS OF Ex-
TREMITY: NIETZSCHE, HEIDEGGER, FOUCAULT, DERRIDA (1985); Frederic Jameson, The Poli-
tics of Theory: Ideological Positions in the Postmodern Debate, 33 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE
53 (1984); Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146
NEW LEFT REv. 53 (1984); JEAN LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION (1984).
Further, concerning the meaning of modernism alone, while there is no agreement on
exactly what it is, there does appear to be consensus on what it is not. A common miscon-
ception is the practice of equating modernism with modernization, and modernist with mod-
em. Modernism should properly be viewed as a culture of related ideas, beliefs, values, and
aesthetics, originating in the mid to late nineteenth century. A modernist is someone or
something which partakes of this culture. Modernization, however, denotes a process of so-
cial and economic development, involving the emergence and growth of industry, technology,
urbanization, and bureaucratic institutions, that can be traced back to the seventeenth century.
Modem is someone or something which participates in this process. Thus, regardless of the
etymological similarity, modernism and modernization, and modernist and modem, must be
differentiated.
28. Alliance for a Superfund Action Partnership, Eight Point Plan of Action 2 (Jan.
1994) (on file with the authors).
1127
11
Shutkin and Lord: Environmental Law, Environmental Justice, and Democracy
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994
WEST VIRGINLA LAW REVIEW
As the New Bedford case illustrates, some of the delay can be
attributed to community resistance to cleanup decisions and to conflict
between the EPA, the PRPs, and the community. The failure of
Superfund to adequately incorporate and engage community concerns
therefore largely accounts for Superfund's limited success. In other
words, Superfund's reliance on expertise and rejection of community
input-its modernist stance-is a substantial part of the problem with
Superfund.
Clearly, science and technology are significant when it comes to
environmental protection. To be sure, they are elemental. However, in
a democracy such as ours, so too is community participation. What
makes environmental law of the sort conceived in the early 1970s
decidedly modernist, and thus problematic, is its eclipsing embrace of
science and technology at the expense of meaningful community in-
volvement.
The enviromnental justice movement's push for greater community
participation in environmental decisionmaking, as in New Bedford, is
in many ways a call for a postmodem environmental law. Since the
late 1960s, "a noticeable shift in sensibility, practices, and discourse
formations which distinguishes a post-modem set of assumptions, expe-
riences and propositions from that of a preceding period" has oc-
curred. 9 Across diverse fields and disciplines, postmodemism has pro-
duced a "rage against humanism and the Enlightenment legacy"--the
primacy of rationality and science."
At its most elemental, postmodernism denotes a rejection of ab-
stract reason and an aversion to the idea that human emancipation can
be achieved through the enlistment of the powers of technology, sci-
ence, and rationality. Unlike modernism, postmodemism accepts the
fleeting and chaotic, rejecting claims to universal truth or transcen-
dence. In other words, postmodernism devalues modernism's meta-nar-
ratives, -languages, and -theories regarding science and rationality; they
are seen as totalizing and hegemonic. Instead, postmodernism embraces
plurality, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and "otherness."3' Indeed, a de-
29. DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 39 (1989).
30. HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 25 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985).
31. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POwER/KNOwLEDGE (1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
[Vol. 96:11171128
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fining feature of postmodern practice is a commitment to listening to
the voices of the oppressed, the marginalized.
Moreover, postmodernism problematizes the relation of language to
reality and views cultural life as a series of perpetually interweaving
texts and meanings. Thus, on a postmodemist view, we can never un-
derstafid the way the world "really is" nor should we aspire to such
knowledge. Accordingly, pragmatism becomes the only valid philoso-
phy of action because it is committed exclusively to "some local deter-
minism" or "some interpretive community" and not to a priori truths
or transcendent values.32
Pragmatism stands as a conspicuously anti-foundationalist, distinc-
tively American,3 approach to such traditional philosophical concepts
as truth, justice, and reason. Pragmatism holds that no single theory
can ever function as a complete guide to the realization of these or
any other philosophical ideals.
Pragmatism privileges above all else democratic decisionmaking, or
inquiry, as a means by which citizens solve problems. For example,
John Dewey argued that "[A]I1 knowledge is the product of special acts
of inquiry. ' 34 "The essential need," he wrote, ". . . is the im-
provement of the method and conditions of debate, discussion and
persuasion ... We have asserted that this improvement depends essen-
tially upon freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of dis-
semination of their conclusions. 35
Inquiry and knowledge together constitute what Dewey called
"intelligence." The alternatives to intelligence, he warned, "are either
drift and casual improvisation, or the use of coercive force stimulated
FOUCAULT READER (1984); LYOTARD, supra note 27; RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRO-
NY, AND SOLIDARITY 3 (1989). Postmodemism purports to attend to the many voices si-
lenced or marginalized by the imperialism of enlightened modernity that presumed to speak
for them. Thus, in much of Foucault's work, for instance, we see a concern for interstitial,
marginalized groups and a desire to reconstruct and represent their voices and experiences.
32. HARVEY, supra note 29, at 52.
33. CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF
PRAGMATISM (1989).
34. JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 193-94 (1929).
35. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 208 (1927).
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by unintelligent emotion and fanatical dogmatism. '3 6 Thus, Dewey
wrote: "Faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is
the projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the instru-
mentalities of its realization, is our salvation. And it is a faith which
must be nurtured and made articulate . . .,.
In turn, intelligence must serve democracy. For Dewey, democracy
is the idea of communal life itself which, in practice, provides the
framework for individuals to express their interests, to take seriously
the consequences of those interests, and ultimately, to develop ways of
promoting attractive consequences and preventing obnoxious ones.
Thus, the ideal community is one in which citizens can plan conduct,
learn relevant facts, and make experiments in order that they may
come up with better resolutions to human predicaments.
Mari Matsuda also extols the democratic virtues of pragmatism.
She argues that "pragmatism is attractive to subordinated people be-
cause it is often their indigenous method. Pragmatism recognizes multi-
ple consciousness, experimentation, and flexibility as tools of inqui-
ry."38 Thus, pragmatism signals a commitment not only to democratic
principles, but also social justice.
In sum, pragmatism, as a component of postmodernism, embraces
participation and inquiry. Yet pragmatism does not discountenance
science or rationality. To be sure, pragmatism is grounded in a belief
in the primacy of the scientific method. Pragmatism merely asserts that
the method itself must be inclusive, flexible, and democratic.
The claims for inclusion made by citizens such as those in the
New Bedford case go to the core of the problem of modernist environ-
mental law. They challenge the traditional reliance on science and
technology as the only valid means by which environmental protection
can be achieved. They assert vigorously that more community partic-
ipation in environmental decisionmaking will improve the system by
36. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 51 (1935).
37. John Dewey, Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, in ON EXPERIENCE, NATURE,
AND FREEDOM: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 69 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1960).
38. Mari Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 So.
CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (1990).
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reducing conflict between communities and government and by enrich-
ing the process. Moreover, the claims of environmental justice advo-
cates for better environmental laws speak to the needs of traditionally
marginalized communities. In this way, the claims for inclusion are
claims for a better democracy.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of conflicts such as in the New Bedford case, the EPA
itself has come to recognize that its processes must change. In an
internal memo regarding the permitting of hazardous waste incinerators,
the EPA indicated that it would provide for greater public participation
in the future. Specifically, the EPA stressed that citizens ought to be
involved earlier in the decisionmaking regarding hazardous waste siting
and that citizens ought to participate in the risk assessment process.39
In addition, there is a general agreement both inside and outside
the Federal government that as Congress considers reauthorizing
Superfund during the 1994 session, it must provide for better public
participation in the Superfund process. For example, the Alliance for a
Superfund Action Partnership believes that community leaders and
concerned citizens should be involved at the beginning and throughout
the Superfund process and calls for public meetings before every deci-
sion in the process, formation of Community Work Groups as soon as
a site is listed as a Superfund site, reform and simplification of the
Technical Assistance Grant process that provides funds to Community
Work Groups, and funding to underprivileged communities.40 Though
the Alliance does not agree with other aspects of the Clinton
Administration's version of the Reauthorization, it does feel that the
Administration's plan "calls for very positive new provisions to involve
the public in Superfund decision making."41
39. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Draft Strategy for Combustion of
Hazardous Waste 11 (May 1993).
40. Alliance for Superfund Action Partnership, supra note 28, at 15-16.
41. Id. at 29. The Alliance's main concern with the Administration proposal is that
the funding for these reforms is not established in the bill. In addition, the Administration
proposal does not address what the Alliance calls the community empowerment agenda:
training citizens and involving minority business in cleanup. Id.
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Environmental justice advocates in New Bedford have done more
than stop an incinerator. They have highlighted the crucial distinction
between public participation in the books and public participation in a
democracy. The New Bedford mediation debunks the traditional "ex-
perts only" myth in environmental law and serves as an example of
the type of process in which the EPA ought to engage in every case.
Perhaps, then, environmental law is beginning to shed its modern-
ist garb. Without having to abandon either science or technology, a
postmodern environmental law will better reflect the conditions and
needs of the moment. Realizing that the traditional model of environ-
mental law has failed in large part because it has ignored the
distributional effects of environmental regulation, relied too much on
the power of science to cure environmental ills, and discounted the
influence of power on environmental decisionmaking, we should make
community involvement a central feature of every environmental law.
Simply put, we should make our regime of environmental laws robust-
ly democratic.
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